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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The topic of this year’s International Law Weekend, “The United 
States and International Law: Legal Traditions and Future Possibilities,” 
cries out for additional historical perspective.  This may, at least initially, 
sound like a surprising claim.  Conversations about the relationship between 
the United States and International Law seem saturated with history.  
Advocates of American participation in the International Criminal Court and 
opponents of Bush Administration tactics in the war on terror both harken 
back to American sponsorship of the Nuremberg tribunals to support their 
views.  The names of obscure World War II-era cases like Quirin,1 
Eisentrager,2 and Hirota3 roll off the tongues of lawyers debating the Bush 
Administration’s tactics in the war on terror.  More generally, foreign affairs 
law and foreign affairs law scholars often seemed obsessed with history—
even compared to constitutional law scholars.  We pour over 19th century 
prize cases,4 long-forgotten international incidents,5 and long-lost treatises 
                                                 
∗ Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law; J.D., New York University 
School of Law 2003; M.A. History, Yale University 2000; B.A., Yale University 1998.  
Thank you to organizers of International Law Weekend and to my fellow panel members, 
Elizabeth Borgwardt, John Witt, Dan Hulsebosch, and David Golove, for the opportunity to 
put this panel together.   
1 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
2 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
3 Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1949). 
4 See, e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. 
(2 Cranch) 64 (1804); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 101-02 (1825);  
5 See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, ‘De Facto Sovereignty’:  Boumediene and Beyond 
(forthcoming George Washington Law Review) (discussing Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 
202 (1890), a case concerning jurisdiction over murder committed on a disputed guano 
island). 
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on the law of war.6  We bandy around the names of long-dead scholars like 
Grotius, Vattel, and Bynkershoek as if they were close personal friends. 
Even foreign affairs law doctrine gives history a role, recognizing the force 
of longstanding political branch practice.7 
And yet, the work of the four scholars on this panel—Elizabeth 
Borgwardt, Associate Professor of History at Washington University in St. 
Louis, John Fabian Witt, Professor of Law and History at Columbia Law 
School, David Golove, Hiller Family Foundation Professor of Law at New 
York University School of Law, and Daniel Hulsebosch, Professor at New 
York University School of Law—highlight how little we really know about 
the history of American perspectives on international law.  Largely lost 
amongst the history of American diplomacy and warcraft, foreign affairs 
caselaw and doctrinal development is the rich cultural and intellectual 
history of American engagement with international law and justice.  What is 
international law?  Is it a progressive tool to achieve American goals and 
ideals, a means of negotiating cooperative solutions to transnational 
problems, or an illegitimate foreign attempt to constrain U.S. power?  
Different Americans, at different times, have held these and other more 
complex views of international law.  Debates between these views have had 
major impact on the shape of international institutions and American 
engagement with them.  Yet very little of this is captured by the more 
traditional legal histories. 
American conceptions of international justice and ideas of American 
mission have long helped shape international law and institutions.  
Conceptions of American national identity, in turn, have been deeply 
influenced by international law and by American perceptions of it, both 
positive and negative.  This history of ideas begins to bring the dynamic 
relationship between the United States and International Law, its history and 
its potential future, truly into focus.   These scholars, along with others, have 
begun to explore the history of these ideas.  There is much more to be done. 
This short discussion describes some of the real, powerful 
contributions this new type of historical scholarship can make to our 
understanding of American relations with international law and the rest of 
the world.  In particular, it focuses on three specific contributions:  enriching 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590-609 (2006) (quoting extensively from 
“The classic treatise penned by Colonel William Winthrop, whom we have called ‘the 
‘Blackstone of Military Law,’’” (internal citation omitted)). 
7 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J. 
concurring) (“In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have 
also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the 
structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the 
President by § 1 of Art. II.”). 
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and improving our historical picture of American relations to international 
law, complicating the common stereotypes of that relationship that dominate 
current debates, and facilitating study of various theories of international 
law, particularly constructivist ones.  It also serves as a call for more 
scholarship in the area.8   
 
II.  MISSING PIECES 
 
 Scholarship on American ideas about international law and justice 
seeks to fill a major gap in the legal literature.  Despite voluminous 
scholarship on the history of the United States and international law, the 
intellectual history of American perceptions of, engagement with, and 
contributions to international law remain amazingly underdeveloped.   
The grand majority of legal-history scholarship on the United States 
and international law focuses on the history of U.S. Foreign Affairs law.9  
This scholarship tends to focus on one of two sets of questions.  The first is 
how various Constitutional provisions that concern foreign affairs, e.g., the 
treaty clause,10 the declare war clause,11 the foreign commerce clause,12 the 
define-and-punish clause,13 the ambassador clauses,14 have historically been 
interpreted and how those clauses incorporate, ignore, or otherwise respond 
to international law.   The second set explores questions typical of 
diplomatic history, asking how various American leaders have interpreted, 
followed, or violated international law in their practice of foreign affairs and 
war.15 The importance of both sets of questions has only been enhanced by 
recent events and controversies—the fight against global terror has raised 
difficult constitutional and international law questions—and nothing in this 
discussion should be understood as diminishing the importance of this work 
in any way. 
                                                 
8 For more discussion of some of these issues, see Harlan Grant Cohen, The American 
Challenge to International Law:  A Tentative Framework for Debate, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 551 
(2003).  
9 This is to be contrasted with more strictly historical scholarship, in which the intellectual 
and cultural history of American foreign policy has been extensively explored.  Scholars of 
international and American foreign affairs law would be well-served to engage with this 
historical work. 
10 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
14 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  
15 As a note, one result of this focus on U.S. Foreign Affairs law is that American views of 
international law are rarely placed in the context of scholarship on international law history 
rather than scholarship on American history. 
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But read alone, these histories present a distorted and potentially 
dangerous picture of American perspectives on international law.  One 
problem with the focus of these histories is that it tends to encourage a 
picture of the United States and international law as in opposition, as two 
distinct entities eyeballing each other across a rift (to some, that rift might 
look like the Atlantic Ocean), sometimes embracing, sometimes ignoring 
each other, sometimes in conflict.  In these histories, the Constitution’s text 
treats international law in some way; American leaders choose to follow or 
not follow international law’s precepts.  Such a distinction between the two 
is clearly overdrawn.  International law is not an entity, but an idea, or set of 
ideas.  While some Americans at some times may have been opposed to 
those ideas, others have believed deeply in them, and still others have 
helped shape them.  It is strange to talk about the United States, as a state, as 
having any kind of distinct relationship with them.  But this oppositional 
view, even if misperceived, can be quite dangerous, lending support to some 
commonly-held views about American exceptionalism, a concern that will 
be discussed in the next section. 
These sorts of histories also tend to overemphasize a particular 
conception of international law:  international law as a body of rules either 
to be observed or violated, an “International Law” in quotation marks.  In 
these histories, the question is usually how a particular rule of international 
law is treated, either by the constitutional text or by American leaders.  
Although international law can be described, at any given point, as a 
collection of rules on particular subjects, at least historically, international 
law has been much more than just a set of blackletter rules (if anything 
blackletter rules often seen maddeningly missing).  A broader, better 
understanding of international law would place those rules in their larger 
context, as part of a constantly evolving set of ideas and normative 
commitments about international relations, justice, and governance.  To 
truly understand the complex relationship between Americans and 
international law, one must look not only at legal developments, but at 
discussions of American mission and Manifest Destiny, anti-slave trade 
movements,16 immigrant anti-colonialism,17 the international peace 
movement,18 Jacksonian isolationism,19 and the development of various 
American foreign policies from the Monroe Doctrine to Wilsonianism to 
                                                 
16 See generally Jenny S. Martinez, Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human 
Rights Law, 117 YALE L.J. 550 (2008). 
17 See generally MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, SPECIAL SORROWS:  THE DIASPORIC IMAGINATION 
OF IRISH, POLISH, AND JEWISH IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1995). 
18 See John Fabian Witt, Crystal Eastman and the Internationalist Beginnings of American 
Civil Liberties, 54 DUKE L.J. 705, 729-33 (2004). 
19 See Walter Russell Mead, The Jacksonian Tradition and American Foreign Policy, 58 
NAT’L INTEREST 5-29 (Winter 1999/2000). 
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Containment.  Many of these ideas are only tangentially related to specific 
international law rules.  Often, those who developed, held, and discussed 
these ideas did so in non-legal language, citing religious imperatives, 
international morality, global justice, or realpolitik.20  Nonetheless, these 
ideas have consistently shaped American perceptions of international law 
and have informed various Americans in their attempts to reform the 
international system, develop new rules of international law, and create new 
international institutions.  Understanding the diverse positions the United 
States has taken toward international law in the past, e.g., support for the 
creation of the United Nations and the Nuremberg Tribunal but opposition 
to the League of Nations and the International Criminal Court, requires a 
fuller understanding of how each of those institutions either resonated or 
was in tension with other ideological commitments of particular groups of 
Americans.  Predicting the positions future American administrations might 
take on international law and institutions requires a deeper understanding of 
international law’s place within competing foreign policy ideas and 
philosophies. 
But more important than its narrowness and inaccuracy is the ability 
of this description of international law to distort our understanding of 
American perceptions of international law over time.  If international law is 
perceived as no more than a body of specific laws, then the relationship 
between the United States and international law can take one of only two 
forms, compliance or non-compliance.  And of course, not surprisingly, the 
traditional histories focus on specific moments when the choice had to be 
made between compliance and non-compliance.  But it is difficult to 
extrapolate more durable U.S. positions on international law from these 
moments of crisis.21  First, violations of international law are almost 
certainly overrepresented in these histories.  By definition, these moments 
are ones where possible violation of the rule has been placed on the table for 
consideration.  Missing are more general patterns of compliance.  
International law might be most successful when its precepts are so deeply 
internalized by international actors as to make the question of compliance or 
non-compliance unthinkable—the question is simply taken off the table.  As 
a result though, true compliance may mean no discussion of the rule at all; 
most compliance may thus be invisible to history (or at least difficult to 
discern).  Second, these moments of crisis present the most powerful 
possible reasons for violating an international law rule, most notably, 
                                                 
20 See Cohen, supra note 8, at 556-60. 
21 Cf David M. Golove, Leaving Customary International Law Where it Is, 34 GA. J. INT’L 
COMP. L. 333, 348-50 (2006) (making a similar point about the case studies used in JACK L. 
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 225 (2005)). 
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national survival.22  It is unremarkable to find that legal rules (any legal 
rules) will be under the most strain during these moments; as a result, 
moments of crisis tell us little about the more ordinary perceptions of the 
rule.  Even the most human rights respecting states have committed horrible 
acts in defense of national security.23  Most of all, moments of compliance 
or noncompliance fail to capture the complex processes by which the rules 
and institutions of international law are created, debated, transformed, and 
sustained. They fail to capture the complex role the United States and 
Americans have had in helping to shape international law as well as the 
ways those international law has influenced American national identity.  
A number of scholars, including those on this panel, have begun to 
remedy the situation, focusing less on historical conflicts over international 
laws and more on the intellectual history of conceptions of international law.  
Mark Janis, for example, has tracked the transfer of ideas about international 
law from British scholars like Blackstone and Jeremy Bentham to American 
scholars like Joseph Story, James Kent, and Henry Wheaton.24  He has also 
explored the longstanding influence of American religion and religious 
movements on American conceptions of international law and justice and 
the lasting imprints those movements have made on the international law 
rules passed down to today.25  Mary Dudziak has written about the complex 
relationship between the global Cold War politics and the success of the 
civil rights movement in the United States.26  And Jonathan Zasloff has 
focused on the lawyer-statesmen, men like Elihu Root and Henry Stimson, 
who dominated American foreign policy during the first half of the 
                                                 
22 Cf Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1823, 1883–86 (2002) (noting that compliance may be less likely in situations involving 
national security where the cost of compliance may seem higher than those of violation).   
23 The United Kingdom, United States, France, and Israel, for example, have all been accused 
of using torture to fight terrorism.  See generally Ireland v. UK, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at ¶ 
96 (1976) (United Kingdom); Comm'n of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in 
Relation to Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and 
Recommendations 13-14 (2006), available at http:// 
www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf (United States); El-Masri v. United States, 479 
F.3d 296, 313 (4th Cir. 2007) (same); BATTLE OF ALGIERS (Igor Film 1957) (France); HCJ 
5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 46(2) (Israel). Such torture 
may be an inexcusable violation of international law, but its use may not be the best indicator 
of each state’s full commitment to or perception of human rights law, let alone the 
international rule of law more generally. 
24 See generally MARK WESTON JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
GREAT EXPECTATIONS 1789-1914 (2004). 
25 Id.  
26 See generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS:  RACE AND THE IMAGE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2002). 
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twentieth century.27  Each brought their domestic legal training to their new 
foreign policy roles and in the process, transmuted then-current ideas about 
domestic law into American foreign policy.    
Elizabeth Borgwardt, Daniel Hulsebosch, David Golove, and John 
Fabian Witt are all engaged in similar projects.  Elizabeth Borgwardt has 
previously written about the role of domestic New Deal ideas in the shaping 
of the post-World War II international system.28  In her retelling, the 
Atlantic Charter and its four freedoms represented a New Deal manifesto for 
the world, marrying civil and political rights (freedom of speech and 
religion) to economic and social rights (freedom from want and fear).29  
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his fellow New Dealers brought a positive, 
pragmatic vision of the role government and institutions could play in 
rebuilding and managing the world, and the experience of the Depression, 
the New Deal, and World War II created the domestic base of support for 
such actions that had been notably missing during the League of Nations 
campaign following World War I.30  The postwar international machinery—
the United Nations, the Bretton Woods system, and the Nuremberg 
tribunals—were the products of these American ideas and realities.31  Her 
current project looks at the fate of those postwar institutions, particularly the 
Nuremberg principles and the core human rights treaties.  Here though, the 
story changes from one of American influence on international law to one of 
international law’s influence on the United States.  Borgwardt’s new project, 
“The Rise and Rise of the Nuremberg Principles: ‘Constitutionalizing’ 
Wartime Reconfigurations of Sovereignty,” seeks to explain the expanding 
influence of human rights in the face of Cold War domestic opposition to 
human rights treaties.32 
David Golove and Daniel Hulsebosch look at this kind of cross-
influence between American and international law ideas during an earlier 
period.  Their project, “The Status of the Law of Nations in the Early 
American Republic,” places the U.S. Constitution and the early Republic 
                                                 
27 See generally Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy:  The 
Twenty Years’ Crisis, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 583 (2004); Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping 
of American Foreign Policy:  From the Gilded Age to the New Era, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 239 
(2003). 
28 See generally ELIZABETH BORGWARDT, A NEW DEAL FOR THE WORLD: AMERICA'S VISION 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2005). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 This summary is based on Elizabeth Borgwardt’s remarks on the “Historical American 
Perspectives on International law” panel at International Law Weekend 2008, The American 
Branch of the International Law Association, October 18, 2008. 
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into its wider at Atlantic context.33  One aspect of the project is to explore 
the foreign affairs role and impact of the Constitution. As they explain, one 
key purpose of the Constitution was to establish the United States as an 
independent member of the international community of states, capable of 
self-governance, ready for diplomacy, and able to ratify and abide by 
agreements.  The Constitution was designed to impress potential allies and 
trading partners.34  This experiment, in turn, had lasting effects on 
international law, as other new states followed the constitution-writing path 
to independence.  At the same time, Golove and Hulsebosch explain, the 
Constitution was itself deeply influenced by the law of nations.  This second 
aspect of their project traces the path of many international law ideas into 
constitutional doctrine:  The law of nations’ status as “higher” law was 
transferred to the Constitution; ideas about judicial review first applied to 
the law of nations were eventually applied to the Constitution.35  
In an earlier project, John Witt focused on Crystal Eastman’s 
transformation from American labor advocate to international peace activist 
to civil libertarian and explored the internationalist origins of the American 
civil rights movement.36  Witt described how turn-of-the-twentieth-century 
Americans joined in the general fervor for international law and governance 
that swept the world in the years surrounding the 1899 and 1904 Hague 
Conventions, the establishment of the Permanent Court for International 
Arbitration, and other positive developments in international governance.37  
While some, like Elihu Root and the other founders of the American Society 
of International Law, saw these developments as proof of the power of 
international law as a means of mediating between states, Crystal Eastman 
and other members of the international peace movement saw these 
developments as the triumphs of cosmopolitanism.38  The international 
peace movement they joined would link citizens of the world and vindicate 
their rights against the tyranny of states.39  When World War I made 
membership in the international peace movement politically unacceptable in 
the United States, many of the movement’s former leaders refocused their 
                                                 
33 This summary is based on David Golove’s and Daniel Hulsebosch’s remarks on the 
“Historical American Perspectives on International law” panel at International Law Weekend 
2008, The American Branch of the International Law Association, October 18, 2008. 
34 As well as to rectify the mistakes of the Articles of Confederation:  state recalcitrance in 
relation to treaties, foreign policy, and the law of nations was met with the Supremacy 
Clause, federal court jurisdiction over treaties, ambassadors, etc., and the centralization of 
foreign affairs authority in the federal government.    
35 As an example of the former, Golove and Hulsebosch point specifically to Rutgers v. 
Waddington (N.Y. Mayor’s Court, 1784).  
36 See generally John Fabian Witt, supra note 18. 
37 See id. at 725-30. 
38 See id. at 730-33. 
39 See id. at 731-33. 
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efforts on domestic civil liberties, creating the organization that would 
eventually become the American Civil Liberties Union.40   
John Witt’s current project is similarly concerned with the ways 
international law has helped shape American ideals and self-image.41   In 
this project, Witt argues that since early in U.S. history, Americans have 
been torn between two visions of the international law of war:  an 
enlightenment law of war that sought to regulate the conduct of war and 
minimize humanitarian harm, and an earlier “just war” tradition that 
legitimated actions based on the justice of either side’s cause.  Both 
traditions are at work in the Civil War-era Lieber Code, Witt argues.  On the 
one hand, the Code codified humanitarian rules applicable to all sides of the 
conflict.  On the other, it authorized some of the most brutal of Union tactics 
during the final stages of the war.  The tension between these two 
impulses—one towards law and the other towards justice—survives to this 
day, and it is the seeming conflict between them, Witt argues, that has 
animated many of the most difficult debates over American war-fighting.  
All four of these scholars are thus beginning to provide a fuller 
history of the American relationship with international law and justice. The 
cultural and intellectual history that emerges is far more complex than often 
presumed.  Americans and international law ideas have been deeply 
influenced by each other and cannot be easily disentangled even when in 
seeming opposition.  The relationship between the United States and 
international law cannot be understood solely in terms of legal rules, 
compliance, and non-compliance.  Instead, a deeper understanding of how 
international law responds to American self-identity, American views of the 
United States’ role in the world, and American conceptions of international 
justice is required.  
 
III.  BEYOND CARICATURE 
 
Popular discussions of the relationship between the United States 
and international law often fall back on a few common but dangerous 
memes about that relationship.  History of the type described here can help 
rectify and complicate these too quickly drawn caricatures.  
There are a few different caricatures of American relations to 
international law.  The first involves a tendency towards presentism.  This 
caricature essentializes current perceptions of American relations to 
international law—for example, the view that the Bush Administration 
                                                 
40 See id. at 746-50. 
41 This summary is based on John Witt’s remarks on the “Historical American Perspectives 
on International law” panel at International Law Weekend 2008, The American Branch of the 
International Law Association, October 18, 2008.  
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opposes international law—and projects it back into the past, creating an 
almost inevitable chain from the founding of the Republic to today.42  
Depending on who’s telling the story and when, this presentism lends itself 
to a overly simplified and sometimes dangerous pictures of the United States 
as longstanding “champion” of international law,43 or constant defender of 
American rather than European or international values, or eternal opponent 
of international governance.  
Whereas this first caricature essentializes the present, two other 
caricatures essentialize apparent aspects of American identity or thinking.  
The latter two are thus essentially versions of American exceptionalism.  
One might be described as a normative exceptionalism.  Versions of this 
caricature emphasize the founders’ desire to break with the ways of the old 
world—to be a “city on a hill.”44  According to this caricature, the United 
States holds and has held different values from other parts of the world.  
These values might include different (or in some views, greater) 
commitments to democracy, or liberty, or individualism.45  One recent 
                                                 
42 See, e.g., Mark C. Rahdert, Comparative Constitutional Advocacy, 56 Am U. L. Rev. 553, 
589 (2007) (“Contemporary negative reactions to the use of comparative constitutional 
precedent tap into a longstanding tradition of exceptionalism and particularism in American 
attitudes toward foreign law.); Edward Lazarus, A “Moral” Foreign Policy That Ignores 
International Law?:  The History and Ironies of the U.S.'s Current View of Its Role In the 
World, Findlaw’s Writ, Thursday, May 01, 2003, available at 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20030501.html (“The recent surge of moral thinking in 
U.S. foreign policy has longstanding roots in our national history and spirit—and indeed, in 
world history.  It's likely to be a feature of U.S. policy for a long time.”). 
43 See, e.g., Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2053 (“[T]he United 
States has a longstanding presence in international human rights treaty negotiations and has 
made significant contributions to the contours of human rights practice, policy, and action 
worldwide.”); id. at 2054 (“The longstanding nature of the relationship between the United 
States and the United Nations has built a deep reservoir of shared human rights 
commitment.”); Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, Adding Teeth to United States 
Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:  The International Human Rights 
Conformity Act of 1993, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1209, 1213 (1993) (“Uncorrected derogation 
thus may prompt serious and continuing international opprobrium at the same time as it 
undermines our standing as a longstanding champion of human rights.”). 
44 John Winthrop, City Upon a Hill (1630), reprinted in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY 7 (Thomas G. Patterson ed., 1989); George Washington, Farewell Address 
(1796), reprinted in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 76 (Thomas G. 
Patterson ed., 1989) (“Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very 
remote relation.”); see also Paul W. Kahn, American Hegemony and International Law 
Speaking Law to Power:  Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New International 
Order, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2000) (“America’s relationship to the rest of the world still 
seems to us to be one of example:  the ‘city on a hill’ that the rest of the world is to imitate”). 
45 Adam Liptak, U.S. Court is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008 
(“‘It’s American exceptionalism,’ Professor [Eric] Posner added in an interview. ‘The view 
going back 200 years is that we’ve figured it out and people should follow our lead.’”); 
Steven G. Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”:  American  
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example argues that Americans are constitutionalists, viewing popular 
sovereignty as the most legitimate source of law, while Europeans are 
universalists, looking beyond democracy to universal fundamental rights.46   
The second form of exceptionalism, by contrast, is almost anti-
normative.  This caricature describes the United States as a holdout from 
international law and institutions, a state only willing to abide by 
international law to the extent it suits its interests.  This view explains the 
different views that the United States has had of international law—support 
for the creation of the United Nations, but apparent contempt for it now, 
sponsorship of the Nuremberg tribunal but opposition to the International 
Criminal Court, support for the WTO but opposition to Kyoto—as no more 
than naked power politics and blatant hypocrisy.47   
Most international law scholars know that these caricatures are 
overdrawn and are usually careful to couch them in those terms.  
Nonetheless, these memes can be quite powerful and pervasive, particularly 
in more informal settings.  These caricatures are also quite dangerous, 
suggesting an inevitability in American views of international law that can 
make progress difficult.  Normative exceptionalism becomes a defense 
against calls for cooperation or compliance; an American tradition of 
pragmatism (or hypocrisy) becomes an excuse in itself for unilateralism.  
Belief in longstanding American support for international law obscures the 
real concerns of international law’s opponents and the equally long tradition 
of isolationism.  Those holding this view may also fail to recognize the 
importance of American violations, as each is swept aside as a mere 
exception to the general rule of compliance.48  None of these caricatures 
encourage the engagement with ideas necessary to move past disagreements 
and to find common ground. 
                                                                                                                  
Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. 
REV. 1335, 1378 (“Like it or not, Americans really are a special people with a special 
ideology that sets us apart from all the other peoples of the Old and New Worlds.”).  
46 See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971 
(2004).  See also ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER 3 (2003) (“It is time to stop 
pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world…Americans 
are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.”). 
47 See, e.g., Moisés Naím, Missing Links: The Hypocrisy Audit, FOREIGN POL’Y 
(September/October 2008) (“Double standards have always been a part of U.S. foreign 
policy.”); JULIE A. MERTUS, BAIT AND SWITCH:  HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1 
(2004) (“The United State is in fact still leading the world on human rights, but in the wrong 
direction, promoting short-term instrumentalism over long-term ethical dealing, double 
standards instead of fair dealing, and a fearful view of human nature over a more open one.”).  
Cf. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 20 (4th ed. 2006) (“Hypocrisy is rife in 
wartime discourse, because it is especially important at such a time to appear in the right.”). 
48 More cynically, the notion that the United States is a longstanding supporter of 
international law can become a shield against rightful criticism of U.S. actions.  Each 
violation is justified by its exceptional nature.  
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The type of history discussed here provides an antidote to these 
common caricatures.  Far from essentializing the present or certain 
American values, these projects unearth a series of counter-stories of how 
different Americans, at different times, translated ideas about American 
values into very different views on international law and international 
justice.  Early leaders of the Republic turn to international law to protect the 
country’s independence.49  New Dealers translate their ideas about domestic 
justice into the Atlantic Charter and postwar international institutions,50 but 
Cold War Americans retreat from international agreements they fear might 
be used to undermine their values.51  Early twentieth century rights 
advocates first look outside the U.S., to world citizenship, as a protection 
against governmental abuse, but eventually discover the values they hold 
dear in American civil liberties.52  And Americans beset by war are torn 
between the justice of their cause and their commitment to the law of war.53   
Moreover, although each of these scholars tells stories that are 
uniquely about the United States—the ways domestic politics and domestic 
political ideologies have shaped American views of international law—
theirs is at the most a very different type of exceptionalism.  The Americans 
they describe do see international law through the lens of their own history, 
culture, and national ideology, but that history, culture, and national 
ideology are often the product of international law ideas as well.  Far from 
placing the United States outside of international law, choosing how to deal 
with it, these scholars tell a story of interaction and cross-fertilization, in 
which the seams between international and domestic ideas quickly 
disintegrate.  In this sense, the American exceptionalism they describe is one 
the United States shares with other international actors, each of whom 
brings its own views of history to these problems.  The United States they 
describe is part of the project of international law (even when seemingly 
opposed to it), not exempt from or outside of it. 
 
IV.  CONSTRUCTION ZONE 
 
 The type of historical project pursued by these scholars can also 
contribute to our understanding of how and when states comply with 
international law.  These projects provide information useful in exploring 
various theories of compliance, including three of the most popular:  
rationalism, liberalism, and constructivism.  Of all those theories, however, 
constructivism may be benefitted most of all. 
                                                 
49 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.  
50 See supra notes 28-26 and accompanying text.   
51 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
52 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.  
53 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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 Of each of these theories of compliance, rationalism may seem to 
have the least to gain from these sorts of historical studies.  Rationalist 
theories (there are multiple flavors with important differences) apply game 
theory and economic analysis to explain and predict when self-interested 
states54 will choose cooperation through international law and international 
institutions.55  The traditional histories of U.S. foreign affairs law might 
seem like the perfect fodder for these sorts of theories.  Focusing on the 
decisions between compliance and non-compliance, between joining treaties 
and spurning them, these histories would seem to provide the perfect cases 
for testing and honing rationalist predictions.56  As David Golove has 
pointed out, however, without a better understanding of historical context, 
rationalists might misidentify the actual choices made and might 
misconstrue cooperation as non-compliance.57  A dispute between two 
states, ripped from its larger context, may look to a rationalist like an 
international law failure.  At times, however, historical context may 
minimize the dispute, revealing the incident as a good faith argument over 
how to apply a rule to which both states are committed.58  The dispute itself 
may be the proof and product of a longer cooperative relationship.59  Proper 
rationalist modeling thus requires a fuller understanding of American 
engagement with that rule and that state.    
 The role these cultural and intellectual histories can play with regard 
to liberal international theory is far more obvious.  Liberal international 
theory “opens the black box of the state and considers the role of substate 
actors.”60  Liberalism suggests that “state interests are best understood as an 
aggregation and intermediation of individual interests.  Sources of power 
                                                 
54 As one rationalist theorist puts it:  “States are assumed to be rational, self-interested, and 
able to identify and pursue their interests…. States do not concern themselves with the 
welfare of other states but instead seek to maximize their own gains or payoffs.”  ANDREW T. 
GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS:  A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 17 (2008). 
55 See Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 64, 79 (2006) (“Political scientists began using rationalism to identify means by 
which international law could facilitate cooperation that would otherwise not occur.  Some 
early work showed how simple games could be used as metaphors for the kinds of 
cooperation problems that could be solved by international organizations and international 
law.”). 
56 See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 45-82 
(2005). 
57 Golove, supra note 21, at 350, 376. 
58 See id. at 375 (“[A] fuller understanding of the circumstances reveals that the United States 
had many compelling reasons to alter its position on these legal questions and that the 
opposite claim—that the United States was fully justified in changing its position is at least 
equally plausible.”).  
59 See id. at 350-76 (discussing dispute over neutral shipping rules during the American Civil 
War). 
60 Guzman, supra note 54, at 18. 
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law      Vol. 15 (forthcoming)   
 14
and interests are found within and between states. International law is driven 
from the bottom up.”61  These histories, drawing the linkages between 
mercantile interests and the Constitution,62 domestic rights advocates and 
the international peace movement,63 New Dealers and the United Nations,64 
can help liberal theorists to explore the mechanisms through which domestic 
interests lead to international action. 
 But it is constructivism that stands to benefit the most from these 
types of history. Constructivist theories of international law suggest that 
state interests and state identity are not constant but are instead 
“constructed” through legal rules, interaction with other states, and the 
activities of individuals and advocacy groups.  “Constructivism asks how 
norms evolve and how identities are constituted, analyzing, among other 
things, the role of identity in shaping political action and the mutually 
constitutive relationship between agents and structures.”65  “International 
law may be understood as both a reflection of identities and interests of the 
powerful, and as a social artifact that reinforces identities, interests, and 
power.”66  Constructivism thus dovetails well with the intellectual and 
cultural histories here.  Like these histories, it seeks to trace the origins of 
particular international and domestic ideas, to understand how Americans 
came to perceive international law in particular ways and how particular 
international law rules and ideas have helped shape American interests and 
identity.  Both these histories and constructivist theory explore the 
mechanisms through which ideas are transferred between individuals, states, 
and the international system, when ideas will be accepted and assimilated 
and when they will be opposed. 
One difficulty in studying international law from a constructivist 
point of view is that developments in international law and perceptions of 
international norms may be overdetermined.  At least with relatively 
contemporary events, it may be very difficult to isolate the real reasons why 
perceptions of international law rules change.67  There are too many actors 
and too many variables.  Here, these cultural and intellectual histories can 
help.  The passage of time may help clarify the mechanisms involved; the 
                                                 
61 Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 55, at 81. 
62 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
63 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.  
64 See supra notes 28-26 and accompanying text. 
65 Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Book Review:  Rationalism and Revisionism in 
International Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1404, 1411 (2006). 
66 Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 55, at 82. 
67 Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellin, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal Integration of 
International Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 767 (2006) (“Constructivism may 
tell us something about global processes and interactions at a macro level, but to the critics 
offers little help in predicting how a norm shift—for example from toleration of the death 
penalty to abolition—will take place.”). 
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relative importance of different events and individuals may emerge—as 
each of these histories suggest.  
But the main concern with constructivist approaches is that they 
yield few of the comprehensive models or predictions that are normally the 
hallmark of social science theories.68  The theory’s embrace of complexity, 
something it shares with history, makes prediction difficult.  Although a 
number of constructivist theories have been advanced, it is difficult to 
imagine a comprehensive model of norm change that can predict with 
precision the different positions states will take with regard to international 
law.69  But the similarities between constructivism and history suggest that 
the criticism is ill-placed.  History too yields few predictive models, but is 
rarely criticized for that fact. 70  We simply understand that the historical 
inquiry is different from that in the social sciences, one more concerned with 
explaining and understanding than with simplifying and predicting.  Putting 
aside for the moment the potential emergence of a comprehensive 
constructivist model of state behavior, constructivists may be best served by 
allying themselves more closely with cultural and intellectual historians like 
those on this panel.  Historians are already experts in constructivist-like 
inquiries, drawing narratives of causation and influence out of seemingly 
incoherent, impossibly complex snapshots of history and weighing the 
importance of individuals and moments.  Together with constructivist 
theorists of international law, they can work to try to understand the 
complex history of international law ideas and the complex ways in which 
they have interacted with American domestic politics and self-identity.    
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
This panel highlights some of the cutting edge historical work being 
done on the intellectual and cultural history of American perspectives on 
international law.  Hopefully, it can also serve as a call to arms for other 
scholars of international and American foreign affairs law, demonstrating 
the real value of engagement with this sort of history.   
 
                                                 
68 Id. (“The central critique of constructivism is that it is insufficiently concrete or specific, 
and thus fails to provide an effective framework through which to make causal predictions of 
state behavior and/or to design a blueprint for regimes or strategies for addressing human 
rights violations.”). 
69 See Guzman, supra note 54, at 20 (“[T]his flexibility makes it difficult for constructivism 
to produce a general and tractable theory of state behavior.”). 
70 Though partisans of social science have at times been known to do so.  
